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The Internet has come a long way and provided
many services and conveniences for its users since
it was first developed by the U.S. Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency.' Originally de-
signed for military and research purposes, 2 the In-
ternet has become ubiquitous to modern life, al-
lowing anyone with online access to share infor-
mation in a digital manner. However, with the In-
ternet's evolution, problems have arisen in regu-
lating and policing content transferred between
users. In response, Congress has enacted several
pieces of legislation designed to address these
pressing issues.
This article will explore how sharing informa-
tion over the Internet, namely through
peer-to-peer ("P2P") network communication,
has facilitated the illegal distribution of copy-
righted materials. It will then examine the re-
sponse to P2P networks by groups such as the Re-
cording Industry Association of America ("RLAA")
and Congress.
The main focus of this article will be on the un-
constitutionality of the RIAA's interpretation of
Section 512(h) of Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). Part II will discuss the im-
pact of the DMCA on the Fifth Amendment due
process rights of an Internet Service Provider
("ISP"). Upon examination, it is clear that, as in-
terpreted by the RIAA, the DMCA violates the due
process rights of ISPs for several reasons. First, the
DMCA does not offer the subpoenaed party an
1 INTERNET SOCIETY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INTERNET
AND RELATED NETWORmS, at http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/cerf.shtml (last modified Nov. 18, 2001).
2 Id.
opportunity to object to turning over information
requested by the copyright holder. Second, it al-
lows a pre-judgment seizure of property, putting
private interests at stake. Third, it places an un-
due burden on the subpoenaed party, clearly de-
parting from traditional subpoena authority. Part
III assesses the impact of the DMCA on the
Fourth Amendment rights of the ISP and its sub-
scribers. Because the requirements of obtaining a
subpoena under Section 512(h) are inadequate, it
results in a clear violation of privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment and allows for an ille-
gal search and seizure at the hands of private par-
ties. Finally, Part IV scrutinizes the implications of
Section 512(h) on the Internet users' constitu-
tional right to free speech. Upon examination, it
becomes evident that Internet users may be
forced to lose their online anonymity, and are
thus further deprived of their constitutional rights
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
A. Peer-to-Peer Networks and MP3s
One method of sharing information over the
Internet is through P2P network communica-
tion.3 A P2P network is "a type of transient In-
ternet network that allows a group of computer
users with the same networking program to con-
nect with each other and directly access files from
one another's hard drives. ' 4 The computers can
communicate and exchange files directly between
- Peer-to-Peer, WHATs?.CoM, at http://whatis.techtarget.
com/definition/0,289893,sid9_gci2l2769,00.html (last modi-
fied Aug. 12, 2001).
4 Id.
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themselves or through a mediating server..5
P2P networks allow users to trade a wide variety
of files back and forth, including written docu-
ments, pictures, software programs, movies and
music. One of the most common types of files
traded is the Motion Picture Experts Group 1,
layer 3-more commonly known as MP3.6 An
MP3 is a digital audio file, compressed to 1/12 of
its original size, that maintains much of the origi-
nal sound quality when played back. 7 The size of
the MP3 file is relatively small compared to that of
the older WAV format, enabling MP3s to be
downloaded more quickly and easily." Because of
this, many people, who lack access to high-speed
Internet connections, have begun to favor
downloading MP3s over P2P networks designed to
facilitate such use. 9 Once a song is located on a
P2P network, it may be downloaded in minutes or
seconds, depending on the speed of the connec-
tion and the size of the file. I"
MP3s have transformed the music industry:
"[t]he advent of MP3s and file sharing technolo-
gies has completely changed the Internet music
environment. The small size of MP3s and the file
sharing technology available makes it easy and in-
expensive for users to seek and copy digital music
over the Internet.""II Also, the software needed to
access P2P networks is easily obtained, usually at
no cost, and relatively user-friendly. 12
5 DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE,
PEER-TO-PEER: TOWARD A DEFINITION, at http://www.ida.liu.
se/conferences/p2p/p2p2001/p2pwhatis.html (last modi-
fied Apr. 19, 2001).
6 Heather D. Rafter et al., Streaming Into the Future: Music
and Video on the Internet, 547 PLI/Pat 605, 615 (1999).
7 MP3, WHATIs?CoM, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/
definition/0,,sid9_gci2l2600,00.html (last modified Dec. 3,
2002).
8 Kristine J. Hoffman, Fair Use or Fair Game? The Internet,
MP3, and Copyright Law, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci & TECH. 153, 155
(2000).
9 Rafter, supra note 6.
10 See Hoffman, supra note 8.
1 I Alex Colangelo, Copyright Infringement in the Internet
Era: The Challenge of MP3s, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 891, 895
(2002).
12 For information about "ripping" MP3s, seeJeremy U.
Blackowicz, Legal Update: RIAA v. Napster: Defining Copyright.1br
the Twventy-First Century?, 7 B.U. J. Sci & TECH. L. 182, 184
(Winter, 2001) (stating that "MP3 files are created through a
process colloquially called 'ripping.' To 'rip' a music CD and
create an MP3 music file, a standard music CD is inserted in
a computer and then, using one of the freely available MP3
encoding programs, the songs are copied to the computer's
hard drive compressing them into the small, easily transmit-
B. Response to Peer-to-Peer Networks
MP3 file swapping became widespread with the
advent of Napster, the first commercially success-
ful P2P music file sharing service. Napster allowed
users to share their music libraries online and free
of charge.' -'4 Alarmed at the popularity of swap-
ping MP3s over P2P networks, the RIAA began a
campaign against Internet piracy, with Napster as
its first target. 14 The RIAA, a not-for-profit trade
association that represents the U.S. recording in-
dustry, produces ninety-percent of the albums re-
leased in the United States.' 5 It estimated that file
swapping over Napster alone cost the record in-
dustry over $300 million in lost sales.1 6 The RIAA
sued to have Napster shut down and, after a long
legal battle, the RLAA prevailed. 17 This was the
RIAA's first major victory against online music file
swapping.'
The death of Napster did not bring an end to
P2P music trading. Other P2P networks, often re-
ferred to as "second generation" decentralized
P2P networks,19 appeared and have become just
as popular as Napster.2°1 Currently operating P2P
services facilitate 3.5 million downloads a week.
2'
KaZaa, a popular second generation P2P site that
facilitates the swapping of movies, pictures, music,
and many other types of formats, recently re-
ported the 100 millionth download of its software,
and it is estimated that over two million people
are on the network at any given anytime. 22 Be-
ted MP3 file format.").
'-1 TECHNOLOGY TIMELINE, at http://www.personal.psu.
edu/users/j/i/jidl02/timeline.html (last accessed Nov. 15,
2002).
14 For a timeline of the courtroom battle between RIAA
and Napster, see A NAPSTER TIMELINE, GRAMMY Magazine at
http://grammy.aol.com/features/0130-naptimeline.html
(last modified June 3, 2002) [hereinafter GRAMMY.com]
15 Hoffman, supra note 8, at 158-59.
16 Ericaj. Rowell, Appeals Court Rules Against Napster, ABC
NEWS.COM, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/
DailyNews/napsterrulingO10212.html (Feb. 12, 2001).
17 GRAMMY.com, supra note 14. See also A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
IS GRAMMY.com, supra note 14.
19 Hisanari Harry Tanaka, Post-Napster: Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing Systems: Current and Future Issues on Secondary Liability
Under Copyright Laws in the United States and japan, 22 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 37, 49 (2001) (describing the characteris-
tics and differences between centralized and decentralized P2P
file sharing systems).
20 See id.
21 Kate Bulkley, New Media: Fair Play or Foul?, THE GUARD-
IAN (London), Aug. 26, 2002, at 20 [hereinafter Bulkley].




cause of the popularity of sites like KaZaa, it is ap-
parent that the new wave of second-generation
P2P networks may prove to be a bigger challenge
to the RIAA than Napster did. In his Comment
discussing criminal prosecution of file sharing,
Aaron M. Bailey23 addressed the dilemma of shut-
ting down P2P network systems:
Although lawsuits may put MP3-trading Web sites out of
business, the problem of file-trading will not end with
Napster and its clones. Napster, which relies on an in-
dex available on a central server, is a vulnerable target
because it is susceptible to a legal attack that can possi-
bly shut down its server, which in turn, shuts down its
entire system. However, this weakness does not apply to
[P2P] technology because P2P does not require a cen-
tral server. Therefore, in the peer-to-peer universe,
there are no companies to sue in the peer-to-peer uni-
verse, only individuals.
24
The death of Napster did not have the effect
that the RLAA hoped it would. According to a re-
port issued by the RIAA, shipments of pre-
recorded CDs have dropped by seven percent in
the first half of 2002; a fact that it attributes to an
increase in music downloads over the Internet. 25
Cary Sherman, the president of the RIAA believes
"l[t] here are numerous red flags and warning bells
that illustrate conclusively the harmful impact of
illegal downloading on today's music industry."26
In addition, the RIAA claims the recording indus-
try loses more than $4.2 billion annually due to
illegal music piracy. 2 7 Opponents of MP3
downloading claim that such unchecked file swap-
ping could destroy the recording industry.28
As a result of its failed tactic of suing corpora-
tions that facilitate illegal file trading, the RIAA is
changing its strategy in its effort to protect its
copyrighted works.2 9 The RIAA has begun to dis-
rupt the flow of songs available on P2P networks
for download by blocking transfers and flooding
TMwqqoKXW8vWWK/cdisplay.html (Aug. 6, 2002).
23 Aaron M. Bailey, A Nation Of Felons?: Napster, The Net
Act, and The Criminal Prosecution Of File-Sharing, 50 AM. U.L.
REV. 473 (Dec. 2000).
24 Id. at 475-76.
25 Brad King, RIAA: Feeling Burn of Ripped CDs, WIRED.
COM, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,54773,00.
html (Aug. 27, 2002).
26 See id.
27 RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, EF-
FEGT-s, at http://www.riaa.com/Protect-Campaign-3.cfm (last
accessed Sept. 15, 2002).
28 Stan Liebowitz, Record Sales, MP3 Downloads, and the
Annihilation Factor, at http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/-liebo
wit/knowledge-goods/records.pdf (Aug. 22, 2002).
29 Declan McCullagh, Watchdogs rap RIAA's file trade
assault, ZDNET.COM, at http://www.zdnet.com.com/2100-
1105-956176.html (Sept. 2, 2002).
the networks with dummy songs (e.g., song files
that are incomplete or repeat only a portion of a
song)."' The RIAA has also recently launched a
multimillion-dollar advertising campaign to con-
vey the message that illegally downloading music
may have serious consequences. 3' Advertisements
headlined "WHO REALLY CARES ABOUT
ILLEGAL DOWNLOADING?" are slated for pub-
lication in the New York Times, the Los Angeles
Times and the congressional newspaper, Roll
Call.3 2 The campaign is spearheaded by Music
United for Strong Internet Copyright ("MUSIC"),
which consists of songwriters, record labels and
managers who aim to persuade the public that
downloading music negatively affects the music
industry. 33 Hilary Rosen, CEO of RIAA, insists,
"[t]his is not a campaign that was created to en-
gender sympathy. We are saying there is a signifi-
cant problem, it is affecting us and it is illegal.
'" 34
Congress is also in the process of formulating a
response to the illegal file swapping taking place
over the Internet. California Congressman How-
ard Berman recently introduced the Peer-to-Peer
Piracy Prevention Act in the House of Representa-
tives.3 5 In explaining the need for this legislation,
Rep. Berman stated that "[t]he day for cleaning
up P2P networks through court action may now
be past ... It may be that truly decentralized P2P
systems cannot be shut down, either by a court or
technologically, unless the client P2P software is
removed from each and every file trader's com-
puter. ''3 6 Rep. Berman believes that "[n]o legisla-
tion can eradicate the problem of peer-to-peer
piracy. However, enabling copyright creators to
take action to prevent an infringing file from be-
ing shared via P2P is an important first step.
37
3o Record labels seek OK for P2P sabotage, CNN.coM, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/internet/O9/27/media.
piracy.reut/index.html (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Record
labels seek OK].
3' Brad King, Music Biz Lament: Stealing Hurts, WIRED.
COM, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,55393,00.




35 Media Industry: License to Hack?, WIRED.COM, at http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,54120,00.html (July
25, 2002).
36 Brad King, File-Trading Furor Heats Up, WIPED.coM, at
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,53662,00.html
(July 3, 2002).
37 Media Industry: License to Hack?, supra note 35.
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The Peer-to-Peer Privacy Prevention Act would al-
low copyright holders access to "Napster-style"
networks in order to prevent the illegal distribu-
tion of copyrighted materials and protect the cop-
yright holders from lawsuits by network owners.
The bill would give copyright owners a number of
technological tools to prevent the illegal distribu-
tion of copyrighted work over P2P networks such
as KaZaa. 38 Berman insists that copyright owners'
would not be able to unleash viruses or destroy
personal files:
Contrary to widespread, if uninformed speculation, our
legislation is narrowly crafted, with strict bounds on ac-
ceptable behavior by the copyright owner . . . It gives
copyright creators a very limited safe harbor from liabil-
ity when they use technological tools for the narrow
purpose of thwarting P2P piracy. It does not allow copy-
right owners to send viruses through P2P networks, de-
stroy files, hack into the personal files of P2P users, or
indiscriminately block lawful file-trading.
39
Opponents of the bill are skeptical. They be-
lieve the bill is vague and they question the scope
of protection that would be afforded copyright
holders under the proposed Act.411 Opponents
fear that some measures, such as overloading a
suspected offending computer by repeatedly re-
questing the same file to be downloaded, or the
flooding of a network with requests for nonexis-
tent files, would adversely affect innocent users. 41
An outspoken critic of the Act stated:
Berman is opening the door to massive denial-of-service
attacks against perceived pirates, without the attacker
having to get prior authorization to launch the attack
•.. This could have devastating effects on computers on
the same network or in the line of fire. For instance, if
everyone on your block has a cable modem, and some-
one is thought to be a pirate, a denial-of-service attack
against that perceived pirate could take the entire
neighborhood cable network down .
4
2
For now, it appears that the RIAA is still at-
tempting to handle the situation on its own, only
now with more drastic measures-by suing indi-
vidual users for copyright infringement.4-3 Individ-
uals may be liable under criminal provisions of
the Copyright Act,44 which some believe would be
38 Michelle Delio, The Dark Side of Hacking Bill, WIRED.
COM, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,54153,





43 McCullagh, supra note 29.
44 17 U.S.C. §506(a) (2002).
45 Bailey, supra note 23, at 476.
46 Id.
enough of a deterrent to make people think twice
about infringing. 45 Bailey commented on the ef-
fects of prosecuting individuals and the difference
between criminal liability and civil liability:
Prosecuting a select few infringers to set an 'example'
may discourage other potential infringers. Criminal lia-
bility for copyright infringement can be distinguished
from civil liability in two ways: (1) a mens rea require-
ment of willfulness; and (2) the requirement that the
infringement exceed a minimum value. Neither of
these requirements poses a significant hurdle for prose-
cutors.
4 6
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
With the advent of new digital technologies
centering on the Internet, Congress passed the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 4 7 ("DMCA").
The DMCA includes a section titled "Limitations
on Liability Relating to Material Online," that
makes existing copyright law compatible with the
Internet. 4 When he first signed the DMCA into
law, President William Jefferson Clinton stated
that the "Act implements [firm] standards, care-
fully balancing the interests of both copyright
owners and users." 49 In his Comment, Gregory
Hunt discussed the history and purpose for the
DMCA:
Congress codified relevant case law to create DMCA,
which amended the [Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recording Act], in part, to regulate the digital
transmission of sound recordings via the Internet. His-
torically, producers and performers did not have copy-
right protection for their sound recordings, but now
they have protection from the counter-culture. This
counter-culture is embodied throughout the digital
arena and believes that music should be free on the In-
ternet. In short, the DMCA buttresses copyright protec-
tion in the digital world.
511
However, the DMCA has been interpreted in
many ways and gives proponents and opponents
little guidance as to its intended purpose.5 1 It is
unclear who the DMCA intends to protect: copy-
right holders from infringement via the Internet,
or the ISPs who act as conduits between subscrib-
47 17 U.S.C. §512 (2002).
48 Timothy James Ryan, Infringement.corn: R1AA v. Napster
and the War Against Online Music PiRAcy, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 495,
513 (2002).
49 Gregory Hunt, Comment: In a Digital Age, the Musical
Revolution Will Be Digitalized, II ALB. L.J. ScL & TECH. 181,
193 (2000).
50 Id. at 194.
51 Jo Dale Carothers, Protection of Intellectual Property on the
World Wide Web: Is the DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
Sufficient?, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 937, 938 (1999).
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ers and the Internet. The answer is that the
DMCA protects both the copyright holder and the
ISP. It protects the copyright holder's right to
ownership from digital piracy but also provides
safe harbors, subject to some limitations and ex-
ceptions, to protect ISPs.
5 2
To protect copyright holders from infringe-
ment by Internet users, the DMCA expedites the
subpoena process under Section 512 (h).53 This al-
lows copyright holders to obtain personal infor-
mation on the infringing users. Section 512(h)
states that "[a] copyright owner or a person au-
thorized to act on the owner's behalf may request
the clerk of any United States district court to is-
sue a subpoena to a service provider for identifica-
tion of an alleged infringer .... -54 Furthermore,
subsection 512(h) (5) provides, that " [u]pon re-
ceipt of the issued subpoena . . . the service pro-
vider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright
owner or person authorized by the copyright
owner the information required by the subpoena,
notwithstanding any other provision of law and re-
gardless of whether the service provider responds
to the notification.
'" 55
To obtain such a subpoena, a sworn declaration
must be supplied by the copyright owner or agent
of the copyright owner, swearing that the informa-
tion will be used only to the extent needed to pro-
tect the copyright.56 Also, Section 512(c) requires
that the material being infringed be identified,
ownership of the material be proved, a statement
of "good-faith belief' that the copyright material
is being infringed, and enough information be
provided for the ISP to locate the material.57 The
information is then filed with the clerk who must
issue the subpoena "expeditiously. '58 Once the
subpoena is issued, subsection 512 (h) (3) compels
the service provider to disclose the information to
the copyright holder.59
Congress realized that because ISPs have "deep
pockets," they need substantial protections
against copyright holders.60 Thus, Section 512 of
the DMCA contains safe harbors that are in-
52 See 17 U.S.C. §§512(a)-(d).
53 17 U.S.C. §512(h).
54 Id. §512(h) (1).
55 Id. §512(h) (5).
56 Id. §512(h) (2) (C).
57 Id. §512(c) (3) (A) (emphasis added).
58 Id. §512(h) (4).
59 Id. §512(h) (3).
60 David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History the Sweet
And Sour Spots of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L.
tended to shield ISPs from liability resulting from
the illegal activities of its subscribers. 6' The
DMCA gives ISPs four main safe harbors:
Title II of the DMCA allows protection for "transitory
digital network communications." The service provider
is entitled to protection from monetary, injunctive, and
equitable relief if certain conditions are met. Further-
more, Title II considers four separate situations in
which a service provider can find shelter under the lia-
bility shield: an entity can be considered an ISP if it acts
as a conduit (Transitory Digital Network Communica-
tions); temporarily stores information on its servers
(System Caching); allows users to store their informa-
tion on its servers (information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users); or if the entity provides
links to information available online (information loca-
tion tools).
6 2
Section 512 (a) is the primary safe harbor provi-
sion, which states that an ISP is not liable for copy-
right infringement "by reason of the provider's
transmitting, routing, or providing connections
for, material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the . . . ISP, or by
reason of the intermediate and transient storage
of that material" in performing this service. 63 In
discussing Section 512(a), Carothers states:
[t]he plain meaning of [S]ection 512(a) insulates ISPs
from claims of contributory copyright infringement re-
sulting from aiding users in accessing material on the
Web... on the condition that: (1) the transmission [is]
at the request of a person or entity other than the ISP;
(2) selection of the material [is] transmitted by a per-
son or entity other than the ISP; (3) selection of the
recipient of the material [is] transmitted by a person or
entity other than the ISP; (4) the ISP [does] not [main-
tain] a copy accessible to anyone other than the re-
questing party; (5) the ISP [does] not [maintain] a
copy longer than is reasonably required for the trans-
mitting, routing, or provision of connections; and (6)
the ISP [transmits the] material without modifica-
tion.
64
With regard to intermediate and transient stor-
age of material on the ISP's server, Section 512(b)
states that system cache that is stored temporarily
on an ISP's server will not give rise to liability.
65
This protects ISPs from infringement claims for
storing temporary copies on its server as a result
of the user's request.6" However, the limitations of
Riv. 909, 917-18 (2002).
61 See 17 U.S.C. §512(a)-(d).
(2 Ryan, supra note 48, at 514 (quoting from 17 U.S.C.A.
§512(a)).
63 17 U.S.C. §512(a).
64 Carothers, supra note 51,*at 954.
65 See 17 U.S.C. §512(b).
66 Carothers, supra note 51, at 954-55 (discussing the fact
that an ISP may not be liable under the DMCA for system
caching: "[s]ection 512(b) limits ISPs' liability regarding sys-
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the protections offered by Section 512(b) have
been noted:
[t]his protection is conditioned on: (1) the material
having been made available on the Web by someone
other than the ISP; (2) the material being transmitted
at the direction of someone other than the ISP; and (3)
the storage occurring as part of an automatic process
for the purpose of making it available to the users.
6 7
An ISP also may be liable if it allows a sub-
scriber to store infringing material on its server. 68
However, under Section 512(c) an ISP is not lia-
ble if it does not have actual knowledge or aware-
ness that the material is infringing a copyright.
The ISP also escapes liability if it does have such
knowledge or awareness, but acts "expeditiously"
to remove the infringing material from its serv-
ers. 6
9
Section 512(d) protects ISPs who provide links
or referrals to infringing material, provided that
the ISPs are not aware of the infringing mate-
rial. 70 Like Section 512(c), if an ISP becomes
aware of infringement relating to its information
location tools, it must act "expeditiously" to dis-
able access to the infringing material.7 '
D. RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.
In order to go after individual users, the RIAA
must identify individual infringers. 72 Although
ISPs are in the best position to uncover infringers,
they are under no obligation to police their own
systems. 73 The RJAA has sought assistance from
ISPs who have access to the names, addresses and
phone numbers of song-swappers.7 4 Most re-
cently, the RIAA asked Verizon Internet Services,
Inc. to provide the name of one of its ISP sub-
scribers, whom the RIAA believes is offering MP3s
tem caching, which involves storing a copy of material in the
system as a result of a request. Specifically, section 512(b) (1)
provides that an ISP is not liable 'for infringement of copy-
right by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of ma-
terial on a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider."') (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 955.
68 See 17 U.S.C. §512(c).
69 Ryan, supra note 48, at 515 (discussing the provisions
within §512(c)).
70 See 17 U.S.C. §512(d).
71 See Ryan, supra note 48, at 515 (discussing the provi-
sions within 17 U.S.C. §512(d)).
72 17 U.S.C. §512.
73 See 17 U.S.C. §512(m)(1); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt.
2, at 45 (2002) (Nowhere does Section 512(d) impose a re-
quirement on ISPs to "make discriminating judgments about
potential copyright infringement.").
for download.7 5 Even after being issued a sub-
poena under Section 512(h) of the DMCA by the
RIAA, Verizon refused to provide the information
because, unlike subpoenas it had complied with
in the past, the allegedly infringing files existed
only on a P2P node and were not stored on Ver-
izon's servers. 76 Verizon claimed protection
under the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, ar-
guing that Section 512(h) subpoenas do not apply
when an ISP merely serves as a conduit for a sub-
scriber who offers allegedly infringing materials
stored on their own computers and not on the
ISP's server. 77 John Thorne, a senior Verizon vice
president, stated if ISPs were forced to turn over
their subscribers' personal information, "consum-
ers will be caught in a digital dragnet, not only
from record companies alleging infringement of
their copyright monopolies, but from anyone who
can fill out a simple form.' '7 8 Verizon contended
that the DMCA was intended to be a shield for
ISPs to hide under, not a sword to be used offen-
sively by copyright holders.7 " It argued that "l[t] he
goal of Section 512 was to limit the possible liabil-
ity of Internet service providers for infringing ac-
tivities in order that 'the efficiency of the Internet
will continue to improve and that the variety and
quality of services on the Internet will continue to
expand.""'8 " It has been said that "[t]he DMCA's
'safe harbor' represents the creation of a special
defense for organizations (ISPs) against charges
of contributory or vicarious copyright infringe-
ment.""'
After Verizon refused to turn over the names,
the RLAA filed a suit with the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia to enforce the
Section 512(h) subpoena.8 2 Judge John Bates
74 Bulkley, supra note 21.
75 Brad King, New Salvo in Piracy, Privacy War, WIRED.
COM, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,54678,00.
htm (Aug. 21, 2002).
76 Id.
77 Opposition of Verizon Internet Services to Motion To
Enforce Ex Parte Subpoena Issued July 24, 2002, at 11-13,
RIAA v. Verizon Internet Service, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Miscel-
laneous Action Case No. 1:02MS00323) [hereinafter Opposi-
tion of Verizon].
78 Declan McCullagh, Verizon Appeals RIAA Subpoena,
CNETnews.com, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-9828
09.html (Jan. 31, 2003).
79 Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77.
80 Id. at 2 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998)).
"I Bailey, supra note 23, at 504.
82 King, supra note 75.
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ruled that Congress used "language that is clear"
when it drafted the DMCA and Verizon's reading
of the act "would create a large loophole in Con-
gress's effort to prevent copyright infringement
on the Internet . . . [giving] copyright infringers
shelter from the long arm of the DMCA subpoena
power, and allow infringement to flourish."83
When the RIAA served a second subpoena on
Verizon, Verizon turned over the names but this
time raised constitutional issues.8 4 Verizon con-
tended that Section 512(h) of the DCMA, as inter-
preted by the RIAA, is unconstitutional because
the clerk of the court lacked the Article III power
to issue a subpoena unless a suit had been filed.8 5
Verizon further argued that Section 512(h)'s spe-
cial subpoena process provisions violates its users'
First Amendment rights.8 6 The district court re-
jected these arguments87 and the decisions with
respect to both the subpoenas are now on appeal
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit.88
The RIAA undoubtedly has the right to uncover
copyright infringers under Section 512(h). How-
ever, Verizon contends that the scope of Section
512(h) does not extend to ISPs who merely act as
a conduit between infringers and the Internet,
and where the infringing material is not stored on
the ISP servers. Moreover, Verizon argues that the
Section 512(h) subpoena power only applies
when the alleged infringing material is stored on
the service provider's network and the ISP is thus
beyond the Section 512(h) safe harbor provi-
sions.89 Verizon accuses the RIkA of "seeking to
expand the [S]ection 512(h) subpoena power to
reach all Internet users, not just those who store
infringing material on the service provider's sys-
tem or network. '9")
83 Memorandum Opinion, at 18-19, RIAA v. Verizon In-
ternet Service, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 02-MS-
0323 (JDB)).
84 AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, COPYRIGHT COURT
CASES, RIAA v. VERIZON, at http://www.ala.org/Content/
NavigationMenu/OurAssociation/Offices/ALAWashing
ton/Issues2/Copyrightl/CopyrightCourtCases/Copy
right_- Court_- Cases.htm#riaa (last accessed Sept. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter ALA].
85 Id.
86 McCullagh, supra note 29.
87 See Memorandum Opinion, RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Service, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Civil Action No. 03-MS-0040
II. SECTION 512(H) OF THE DMCA
VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment states that "no person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.""' As such, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment proscribes:
the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and po-
litical institutions .... It follows that any legal proceed-
ing enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned
by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of
the legislative power in furtherance of the general pub-
lic good, which regards and preserves these principles
of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of
law.
92
Upon examination, it is apparent that Section
512(h) of the DMCA does just that which the
Fifth Amendment prohibits: it does not allow a
subpoenaed party an opportunity to object; it
sanctions a prejudgment seizure of property; and
it places undue burdens upon the subpoenaed
party without due process of law. Accordingly,
Section 512(h) is unconstitutional.93
A. Section 512(h) Provides the Subpoenaed
Party No Opportunity to Object
The RIAA argues that the subpoena authority
of the DMCA under Section 512(h) imposes a
"mandatory, unconditional duty on Internet ser-
vice providers such as Verizon to provide 'expedi-
tiously,' upon receipt of a subpoena, information
sufficient to identify users of their networks who
are pirating copyrighted works.
'" 9 4
However, the RIAA's interpretation of Section
512(h) does not allow the subpoenaed party to
object to turning over the information requested.
(DB)).
88 ALA, supra note 84.
89 Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77, at 2-3.
90 Id. at 3.
91 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535, 537 (1884).
93 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
94 Motion to Enforce July 24, 2002 Subpoena Issued By
This Court to Verizon Internet Services, Inc. and Memoran-
dum In Support Thereof at 1-2, RIAA v. Verizon Internet Ser-
vice, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Miscellaneous Action Case No.
1:02MS00323) [hereinafter Petitioner's Motion to Enforce].
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This clearly contradicts Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that:
a person commanded to produce and permit inspec-
tion and copying may ... serve upon the party or attor-
ney designated in the subpoena written objection to in-
spection or copying of any or all of the designated
materials or of the premises. If objection is made, the
party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to in-
spect and copy the materials or inspect the premises ex-
cept pursuant to an order of the court by which the
subpoena was issued.9 5
Verizon is denied the opportunity to object to the
subpoena. Under Rule 45(c)(2)(B), Verizon
would have the ability to object. The RIAA suit
against Verizon Internet Services, Inc. is a prime
example of Section 512(h)'s conflict with Rule 45.
The RIAA subpoenaed Verizon, who refused to
turn over the material requested and has now
found itself in a legal dispute in which the RIAA is
trying to force Verizon to turn over the requested
information.
An alternative, constitutional, method for ob-
taining the name and personal information of an
alleged infringer would be to initiate a 'John
Doe" lawsuit, which would allow the copyright
holder to file a suit without naming the defen-
dant. The copyright holder could then amend the
complaint after the defendant is identified and lo-
cated.96 Once the John Doe lawsuit is filed, the
copyright holder could serve a third-party sub-
poena on the ISP pursuant to Rule 45 .97 Upon re-
ceiving a Rule 45 subpoena, the ISP would have
an opportunity to object9 8 and the right to file a
motion to quash, e.g., on the grounds that the
subpoena requires disclosure of confidential in-
formation."! Filing a John Doe lawsuit would also
95 FD. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B).
96 Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane & Arthur R.
Miller, CIVIL PROCEDURE 177-78 (2d ed. 1993).
97 Opposition of Verizon, su5pra note 77, at 5.
98 FE. R. Civ. P. 45(c).
,9 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c) (3) (B) (i).
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
1l Brief of Amici Curiae United States Internet Industry
Association, Computer & Communications Industry Associa-
tion, Internet Service Providers' Association (South Africa),
Yahoo!, Inc., Southern Star, Mercury Network, LLC, Netlink
2000, Inc., Zzapp! Internet Services, SMCNet LLC, Ice Com-
munications, Inc., Frontier and Citizens Communications,
and DM Solutions In Support of Verizon's Opposition to Mo-
tion to Enforce Subpoena at 10, RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Service, Inc. (D.D.C. 2002) (Miscellaneous Action Case No.
1:02MS00323) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
102 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
103 Id. at 577-78. See also Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell,
56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a suit involving
John Doe identities could go forward because there was spe-
protect the subpoenaed party from allegations
that have no evidentiary support,"' as discussed
above. 1(1
In Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy,1' 2 the court dis-
cussed the nature of John Doe lawsuits and their
applicability to Internet-related cases, stating:
[a]s a general rule, discovery proceedings take place
only after the defendant has been served; however, in
rare cases, courts have made exceptions, permitting
limited discovery to ensue after filing of the complaint
to permit the plaintiff to learn the identifying facts nec-
essary to permit service on the defendant ... With the
rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit cer-
tain tortious acts, such as defamation, copyright in-
fringement, and trademark infringement, entirely on-
line. The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anony-
mously and may give fictitious or incomplete identify-
ing information. Parties who have been injured by
these acts are likely to find themselves chasing the
tortfeasor from [ISP] to ISP, with little or no hope of
actually discovering the identity of the tortfeasor. 10
3
Requiring a copyright holder to file aJohn Doe
lawsuit and serve a third party subpoena on the
ISP allows the ISP the opportunity to object or to
move to have the subpoena quashed, thus provid-
ing the neccesary due process.
B. Section 512(h) Allows Pre-judgment Seizure
of Property
Confidential information complied by an ISPs
about its customers is generally recognized to be
the property of the ISP."14 In Carpenter v. United
States, "05  the Supreme Court held that
"[c] onfidential information acquired or compiled
by a corporation in the course and conduct of its
business is a species of property to which the cor-
cific enough information to obtain the real identities
through reasonable discovery).
104 Mark D. Bloom, Reorganizing in a Fish Bowl: Public Ac-
cess vs. Protecting Confidential Information, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
775, 788-89 (Fall 1999) (quoting Professor Miller, who states:
"Recent Supreme Court decisions reinforce the status of con-
fidential information as property. Indeed, the Court's recog-
nition of the importance of protecting confidentiality has
never been stronger. In Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., [467
U.S. 986 (1984)] and Carpenter v. United States, [484 U.S.
19 (1987)] the Court significantly enlarged the protections
due trade secrets and other confidential information and de-
clared that 'confidential information is a species of property
to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit.'
Government disclosure of information in which parties have
a property right-which is what some of the public access leg-
islation requires-might amount to a taking of property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment." (citing Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 468 (1991)).
105' 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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poration has the exclusive right and benefit
.... ,"10" Therefore, the names, addresses, phone
numbers, and other information that an ISP ac-
quires through its business dealings with its cus-
tomers constitute property that belongs exclu-
sively to the ISP. Moreover, the Court in Connecti-
cut v. Doehr'07 held that, in determining whether a
pre-judgment seizure of property without notice
or an opportunity to be heard is constitutional, a
court must consider the private interest that will be
affected and the risk of erroneous deprivation
before it could be declared valid under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.' 08 Accordingly,
to force an ISP to turn over property without an
opportunity to be heard constitutes an impermis-
sible pre-judgment seizure of property.
The private interests at risk here include, for in-
stance, the business relationship an ISP holds with
its subscribers. This relationship is a contract that
could be jeopardized and irreparably damaged by
overzealous application of Section 512(h).10 9 For
example, if the ISP turns over confidential infor-
mation, they may be held liable for breach of con-
tract.I lO The ISP would thus be left vulnerable to
civil suits by its clients and the effects of such suits
could potentially become economically devastat-
ing." 1 Furthermore, the ISP could be affected
before such contract is even established because
prospective clients may, due to fear of losing their
online anonymity at the hands of expedited sub-
poenas, elect not to conduct business with an ISP.
C. Section 512(h) Could Potentially Place an
Undue Burden Upon the Subpoenaed Party
The RIAA has stated that, "Title II of the DMCA
seeks to ensure that copyright owners are able to
protect their intellectual property and to give
them enhanced ability to quickly and effectively
deal with copyright infringement on the In-
ternet."' 12 Because suing corporations that facili-
tated infringement did not succeed in preventing
infringement of its copyrighted works, the RIAA
106 Id. at 26.
107 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
108 Id. at 2.
109 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 101, at 13.
1 10 Id.
III Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77, at 20-21.
112 Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, supra note 94, at 3.
113 McCullagh, supra note 29.
114 511 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
has sought to go after individual users involved in
illegal distribution of protected files. 1 3 The po-
tential litigation between RIAA and individual
users may place an undue burden on the ISP.
In Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co.,1 14 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California quashed a sub-
poena to a non-party as an undue burden to the
non-party, because it would have required the
non-party to turn over every piece of correspon-
dence between the defendant and the non-party
corporation. The district court held that the bur-
den to the non-party and the invasion of corpo-
rate privacy outweighed the need for discovery of
the documents. 15 In their treatise on civil proce-
dure, Wright and Miller state, "a subpoena duces
tecum is intended to require the production of
designated documents; it is not designed to put
the person subpoenaed to the expense of compil-
ing information from his records or analyzing
their content."''16 Section 512(h), if applied as the
RIAA suggests,' 17 would likely subject ISPs, such
as Verizon, to an enormous number of subpoenas
daily, a burden that would require a considerable
investment of time and money by the ISP, not
even a party to the litigation." 8
Additionally, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure imposes a duty upon the party is-
suing the subpoena to avoid placing an undue
burden upon the served party. 119 As discussed
above, the RLAA contends that the Section 512(h)
subpoena process applies not only to situations in
which a user may have infringing material stored
on the ISP's network, but also when the infringing
material is stored on the user's computer outside
of the ISP's network. 120 In the former scenario,
Verizon has stated that it complies with such sub-
poenas. '1' However, if Verizon were forced to
comply with a Section 512(h) subpoena every
time a person simply used it as a gateway to the
Internet and engaged in distributing copyrighted
material directly from their own computers and
networks, for which ISPs have no control, Verizon
115 Id. at 229.
116 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2459, at 53 (2d. ed. 1995).
117 See generally Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, supra
note 94.
118 Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77, at 8-9.
119 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1).
120 Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, supra note 94, at 10.
121 McCullagh, supra note 29.
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could potentially be forced to respond to millions
of Section 512(h) subpoenas every day, clearly an
undue burden. 22 Accordingly, the subpoena pro-
cedure under Section 512(h) has the potential to
drown an ISP in paperwork and consume an un-
reasonable amount of employee time. 23
Notwithstanding this, the RIAA claims that re-
sponding to the subpoena "is a simple matter of
fifteen minutes work."' 2 4 Verizon disputes this
and contends that it takes between 15 and 25 min-
utes to identify a single subscriber and if "Verizon
were asked to identify 1,000 subscribers, the pro-
cess of identifying the subscribers could take Ver-
izon employees more than 400 hours."'2 5 This
process represents an undue burden to large ISPs
such as Verizon, which is explicitly forbidden by
Rule 45(c) (1), and could have the devastating ef-
fect of forcing smaller ISPs, who are financially
unable cannot afford to respond to every sub-
poena, out of business.'
2"
What the RIAA apparently believes is that a pri-
vate party should be able to disregard another
party's interest in its property without any eviden-
tiary showing that the information sought is re-
lated to illegal activity or without even initiating
litigation against another party before it obtains
the information. 127 Nowhere else is such a weak
showing of cause permitted in the American legal
system. Some commentators have stated that the
expedited subpoena process of Section 512(h)
represents a "substantial departure from 'histori-
cal and contemporary practices' in the area of
subpoena authority conferred on civil litigants"
and imposes undue burdens upon ISPs who
would be forced to respond to the millions of sub-
poenas that could potentially be requested by
122 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 101, at 23-24.
123 Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77, at 9.
124 Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Enforce, at 2,
RIAA v. Verizon Internet Service, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Miscel-
laneous Action Case No. 1:02MS00323) [hereinafter Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief].
125 Opposition of Verizon, supra note 77, at 9.
126 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 101, at 24 ("For
smaller ISPs, the burden of even as isolated subpoena could
be substantial.").
127 Id. at 22.
128 Id. at 15.
129 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.").
copyright holders. 128
III. SECTION 512(H) OF THE DMCA
VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE CONSTITUTION
The Fourth Amendment' 2 '1 has been inter-
preted as guaranteeing citizens' reasonable expec-
tations of privacy.' 31 Subscribers who use an ISP's
service are citizens who, for a variety of reasons,
may wish to maintain anonymity online and not
want their identity disclosed to third parties. 13'
Once the confidential information is disclosed to
the copyright holder, anonymity is forever lost.
Therefore, ISPs have a substantial interest in pro-
tecting subscriber anonymity and have vowed to
protect their subscriber's privacy rights.'13
2
As discussed above, the Carpenter Court held
that information that a company compiles is con-
sidered property of the company.' 1 By requiring
ISPs to provide their property at the copyright
holder's demand, Section 512(h) condones a con-
stitutionally impermissible search and seizure of
property at the hands of a private party. 34 The
Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to re-
quire that neutral magistrates issue warrants to
search property and that the issued warrant de-
scribe the place to be searched with sufficient
"particularity."' 3 5 In Berger v. New York,'13 6 the
Court held that "the need for particularity and ev-
idence of reliability in the showing required when
judicial authorization of a search is sought is espe-
cially great in the case of eavesdropping." 37 Also,
the Court in Andresen v. Maryland3 8 held that the
purpose of this particularity requirement is to
avoid "a general, exploratory rummaging in a per-
'3" See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment was designed to pro-
tect a person's legitimate, reasonable expectations of privacy,
not to be read literally as protecting only against a physical
invasion of certain protected areas).
13 1 Grant Gross, Judge upholds law requiring ISPs to name
downloaders, COMpuIrERWORLD.COM, at http://www.computer
world.com/securitytopics/security/privacy/story/0,10801,80
687,00.html (April 25, 2003).
132 Katie Dean, Online Anonymity Cones Under Fire, WIRED
NEWS.GOM, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,14
12,58633,00.html (April 26, 2003).
'33 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
3 4 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 101, at 11-13.
1'45 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
''" 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
137 Id. at 56.




son's belongings ... 139
The provision in Section 512(h) that allows for
an expedited subpoena process may be inter-
preted as impermissibly condoning an illegal
search and seizure because there is no require-
ment that the copyright holder gather and re-
quest the information with particularity. 40
Rather, Section 512(h), as the RIAA construes it,
allows a copyright holder to obtain information
on any user from the ISP because all that is
needed is a "good-faith belief' that a particular
user is infringing.
14 1
Under Section 512(h), the process by which a
copyright holder requests information from the
ISP is not very complicated. To obtain a sub-
poena, the copyright owner or agent of the copy-
right owner must supply a sworn declaration hold-
ing that the information will be used only to the
extent needed to protect the copyright. 142 Also,
Section 512(c) requires that the infringed mate-
rial be identified and ownership of the material
be proven.'143 Additionally, the copyright holder
must state a "good faith belief' that the copy-
righted material is being infringed, and must pro-
vide enough information for the ISP to locate the
material. 144 The information is then filed with the
clerk who must issue the subpoena "expedi-
tiously."' 45 Once the subpoena is issued, subsec-
tion 512(h)(3) compels the service provider to
disclose the information to the copyright
holder. 1
46
Copyright holders may base their "good faith
beliefs" on automated searches run by software
("bots") that search the Internet reviewing
filenames and other information.147 When the
search identifies a suspicious file, it marks the lo-
cation and automatically gives notice to the ISP. A
copyright holder then may rely on the potentially
limited amount of information that the bots turn
up and then assert that this information supports
their "good faith belief' and constitutes reasona-
139 Id. at 480. See generally Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S.
476, 481-85 (1965) (describing history and purpose of partic-
ularity requirement).
140 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
141 Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 9-11.
142 17 U.S.C.. §512(h) (2) (C).
143 Id. §512(c) (3) (A).
144 Id.
145 Id. §512(h) (4).
146 Id. §512(h) (3).
147 Declan McCullagh, R/AA apologizes for erroneous letters,
CNETNEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-10013
ble grounds to seek a subpoena.
48
The accuracy of this procedure is extremely
questionable because it is neither particular nor
reliable. Moreover, it is contrary to the Berger
holding, which requires particularity and evi-
dence of reliability. 149 The automated searches
the RIAA runs to find users that are improperly
distributing copyrighted material may turn up
both guilty and innocent users because the
searchers, not the copyright owners themselves
"download and review the suspicious file to deter-
mine if [the material] satisfies the 'substantial
similarity' test under copyright-infringement law
or it carries any of the hallmarks of a fair use of
the work, such as being a parody or a critical com-
mentary about a work."'150 More commonly, the ti-
tle of song that the RLAA finds through a search
may be a title of two or more songs. 1 5 1 For exam-
ple, the odds are good that two different artists
have songs called "Here We Are," or songs that
contain the words "Here We Are" in the title. One
artist with a song entitled "Here We Are" may
have copyrighted their song while another with
the same song title may not have sought the same
copyright protection. Recently, "overzealous copy-
right enforcers" mistook a photo on the Internet
entitled "Portrait of mrs harrison williams 1943"
[sic] for a song by former Beatle George Harrison
and demanded the ISP terminate the user's ac-
count.' 52 Nonetheless, a person distributing the
non-copyrighted version would come up in the
search by the RIAA and without any review of the
suspicious file, the RIAA could present this infor-
mation to the court clerk in order to obtain a sub-
poena requiring the client's ISP to turn over that
client's name and personal information. 53 Essen-
tially, Section 512(h) allows the copyright holder
to assert that the Internet user is illegally sharing
files, without adequate evidentiary support. 54
As stated above, copyright holders must only as-
sert a "good faith belief' that that user is involved
19.html (May 13, 2003).
148 Id.
149 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
15o Brief of Amici in Support of Verizon's Opposition to
RIAA's Motion to Enforce, at 8, RIAA v. Verizon Internet Ser-
vice, Inc., (D.D.C. 2002) (Miscellaneous Action Case No.
1:02MS00323) [hereinafter Consumer Amici Brief].
1'1 Id. at 8-9.
152 Record labels seek OK, supra note 30.
155 Consumer Amici Brief, supra note 150, at 8.
154 Id. at 11.
20031
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
in illegal activities. 55 However, the standard for
what constitutes a "good-faith belief' is ambigu-
ous. Such a vague standard thus allows a copyright
holder to seize personal information about almost
any user on the Internet. Because the copyright
holders rely on the limited information supplied
by bots, the need for particularity and reliability
required by the Fourth Amendment and the case
law is ignored. ISPs and subscribers may thus be-
come victims of illegal searches and seizures at the
hands of third parties.
Further, by allowing bots to obtain the basis for
the copyright holders "good faith belief," Section
512(h) of the DMCA is clearly contradictory to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5"
which provides:
(b) Representations to Court.
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written no-
tion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,-
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary supportor, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable op-
portunity for further investigation or discovery.157
By applying for a Section 512(h) subpoena, the
RIAA is clearly submitting allegations to the court
that are not based on "evidentiary support" or
"likely to have evidentiary support after a reasona-
ble opportunity for further investigation," because
bots leave much room for error and are proven to
be inaccurate. 1
58
IV. SECTION 512(H) OF THE DMCA
VIOLATES THE INTERNET USER'S
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
Not only does Section 512(h) allow for an ille-
gal search and seizure of the ISP's property in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment,1511 it also vio-
lates the user's constitutional right to free
speech.1 6 Copyright holders, by requesting infor-
mation that discloses a user's identity, strip users
155 17 U.S.C. §512(c) (3) (A).
156 FrD. R. Civ. P. Il(b).
157 Id. at lI(b)(3).
158 Consumer Amici Brief, supra note 150, at 7-9.
159 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16(1 See generally U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
"6" McCullagh, supra note 147.
162 Id.
1(3g 1/
of online anonymity and the right to voice their
opinions and beliefs while remaining unknown.
As discussed above, the copyright holder's use
of automated searches run by bots report any user
who may be associated with a file that is suspi-
cious."" However, not every file that the bots re-
port is necessarily an infringing one; many inno-
cent users are swept up in the process.' 62 Because
the copyright holder can rely on such limited in-
formation to retain a subpoena for personal infor-
mation about a suspicious file's owner, innocent
users may be involuntarily exposed and lose their
online anonymity." 3 This violates their constitu-
tional right to anonymous free speech.
In her article, Jennifer O'Brien discusses the
importance of anonymity on the Internet:
Anonymity in cyberspace is not just different in degree
fi'om anonymity in real space. As cyberspace presently
is, it gives an individual a kind of power that doesn't
exist in real space. This is not just the ability to put on a
mask; it is the ability to hide absolutely who one is. It is
notjust the ability to speak a different, or encoded, lan-
guage; it is the ability to speak a language that is (practi-
cally) impossible to crack. Cyberspace is a place that
maximizes both social and individual plasticity, which
means it is a place that determines very little about what
others must know about you. '64
Privacy advocates point out that the courts have
similarly recognized the importance of online an-
onymity: "[t]he Supreme Court has looked [upon
the right to anonymity on the Internet] with
favor, recognizing that the Internet is 'a demo-
cratic institution in the fullest sense; the World
Wide Web constitutes a vast platform from which
the public may address and hear from a world-
wide audience of millions."' ,,5 Privacy advocates
also highlight that the Internet is a playing field in
which all players are equal and can communicate
what may be unpopular rhetoric without fear of
being exposed to the real world realities of harass-
ment or discrimination.'I" In ACLU v. Miller,1 67
the ACLU challenged a Georgia statute that hin-
dered the right to communicate anonymously
over the Internet. The court held that the statute
prohibited protected speech because the purpose
of anonymity was to avoid social ostracism, to pre-
164 Jennifer O'Brien, Putting A Face To A (Screen) Name:
The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPs To Reveal the
Identities o] Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online Defamation
Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REX'. 2745, 2758 (2002).
1h5 Consumer Amici Brief, supra note 150, at 12 (citing
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 884, 853 (1997)).
ll Id. at 12-13.
1G7 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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vent discrimination and harassment, and to pro-
tect privacy.168 Also, in Anderson v. Hale,"' 9 the
plaintiff, seeking subscription information, sub-
poenaed AOL, Yahoo, Microsoft and Netscape for
information on thirteen Internet accounts of
members of The World Church of the Creator.
The court allowed the subpoenas for those ac-
counts in which the individual's name was known,
but quashed those for anonymous accounts, hold-
ing that disclosing the names would violate their
First Amendment right of association, particularly
since the plaintiff did not show the information
was relevant to the case. 17
0
V. RIAA'S CLAIM
The RIAA alleges that the dispute at hand is not
about speech or privacy; it is about theft and
piracy, which require a strict statutory reading of
the DMCA. 17 1 It claims that Section 512(h) is
"crystal clear,"'172 arguing that where a service pro-
vider receives a Section 512(h) subpoena, "the
service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the
copyright owner ... the information required by
the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law."' 73 Contrary to Verizon's argument
that the purpose of the DMCA is to protect ISPs,
the RIAA alleges that Congress enacted the
DMCA because it was concerned that "unless
copyright owners have the ability to identify and
pursue those who infringe their copyrights in the
digital world, they would 'hesitate to make their
works readily available on the Internet,'"1 74 and
that Section 512(h) helps ISPs stop theft.'
175 Ulti-
168 Id. at 1233.
169 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6127 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2001).
170 Id. at 22.
171 Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 1.
172 Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, supra note 94, at 8.
173 Id. at 8 (citing 17 U.S.C. §512(h)(5)).
174 Id., at 2-3.
175 Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 1. How-
ever, Verizon rebuts this point in Opposition of Verizon,
supra note 7, at 10 n.6, by stating:
RIAA turns the legislative history on its head, leaving the
impression that the primary purpose of Title 1I was to
protect copyright owners. Thus, for example, RIAA
quotes out-of-context language from page 8 of the Sen-
ate Report for the supposed proposition that 'Congress
was concerned that, unless copyright owners have the
ability to identify and pursue those who infringe their
copyrights in the digital world, they would 'hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet.' But
RIAA creates the concern about 'the ability to identify
and pursue' out of whole cloth; the quoted passage from
mately, the RIAA contends that Verizon is merely
hiding behind a "sky is falling" policy that is far-
fetched and extreme. 
1 76
Overall, the RIAA contends that Section 512(h)
does not violate any constitutional protections be-
cause it only requires ISPs to turn over personal
information about infringing users. 177 It claims
that the overall structure and purpose of the
DMCA defeats Verizon's claim that Section
512(h) can only be invoked against the subset of
ISPs who store infringing materials on their sys-
tems. 178 RIAA first notes that the DMCA applies
to all ISPs. The DMCA defines "service providers"
in Section 512(a) as:
(A) . . .an entity offering the transmission, routing, or
providing of connections for digital online communica-
tions, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user's choosing, without modification to
the content of the material as sent or received.
(B) [a]s used in this section, other than subsection (a),
the term 'service provider' means a provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefore, and includes an entity described in subpara-
graph (A).17
The RIAA contends that nowhere in Section
512(k) is there a distinction between ISPs that
store material on their networks on behalf of a
user, and those that do not. As a result, a copy-
right owner may subpoena any ISP, under Section
512(h) whether or not it is storing material on its
network.)' Had Congress intended to limit Sec-
tion 512(h) in such a manner, it could have done
so in any number of ways, such as by including an
express condition that the ISP be storing infring-
ing material on its network, but it included no
such language.' 8 '
the Senate Report says nothing of the sort. Rather, the
Report's reference is to a concern about the 'ease with
which digital works can be copied and distributed,' and
the solution posited by the Senate Judiciary Committee
is '[1]egislation implementing the [World Intellectual
Property] treatises,' which is addressed in Title I of the
DMCA. In large part, Title I creates liability for the cir-
cumvention of technological measures that control ac-
cess to copyrighted works. In contrast, Title II, Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, as its name
suggests, creates safe harbors that limit liability. In short,
RIAA relies on legislative history that has nothing to do
with Section 512, which was part of Title 1I of the DMCA.
(internal citations omitted).
176 Id. at 4.
177 Id. at 15.
178 Id. at 10-11.
179 17 U.S.C. §512 (k)(1).
180 Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 124, at 5-6.
I81 Id. at 6.
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The RIAA fails to look at the structure of Sec-
tion 512(h) as a whole. Upon close examination,
it is clear that the section is facially unconstitu-
tional because, as discussed above, it violates the
ISPs' right to due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Whether or not the user is storing infring-
ing material on its network, Rule 45(c) clearly re-
quires that the ISP be given an opportunity to ob-
ject to the subpoena-Section 512(h) clearly de-
nies the ISP such an opportunity. 182 The contro-
versy at hand is only the latest example of the in-
adequacy of the expedited subpoena process of
Section 512 (h). Verizon feels that the information
requested by the RIAA should not be turned over
because Verizon has a business contract with the
user and disclosure of the customer's information
will subject Verizon to costly litigation.
The obvious due process concerns that result
from the requirements of Section 512(h) also give
credence to the "sky is falling" outlook that Ver-
izon foresees. If Verizon is forced to turn over the
information about one user via Section 512(h), it
could lead to millions of subpoenas and place an
enormous burden on other ISPs, who would ei-
ther have to violate privacy contracts with their
users and be forced to defend themselves in law-
suits by those users, or continue to refuse to turn
over the requested information by copyright hold-
ers and be forced to defend themselves against
the RLAA. Section 512(h) places ISPs in a vulnera-
ble position because it leaves no room for objec-
tion as provider for under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 45. Thus, Section 512(h) is
clearly unconstitutional.
The RIAA further alleges that pursuant to Sec-
tion 512(h), "district courts are authorized, at the
request of copyright owners, to issue subpoenas to
Internet or on-line service providers.., where the
copyright owner has a good faith belief that the
infringement is occurring and needs additional
information to identify the alleged infringer."l183
The RIAA fails to realize that Section 512(h) is
unconstitutional as it is inadequate to require
only a "good faith belief' from a copyright owner
that a user is infringing to obtain a subpoena.
1 4
As discussed above, in order to obtain a sub-
poena, copyright holders merely have to present a
182 FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B).
181 Petitioner's Motion to Enforce, supra note 94, at 3.
184 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3)(A).
185 Consumer Amici Brief, supra note 150, at 7.
belief that a particular user is infringing. Search
bot software is often used to detect suspected in-
fringers. This software compares terms in files
held by any user to terms in the copyright
holder's property,18 5 often relying only on terms
in the title of the files and concluding, without
any further evidence or review, that the user is
stealing their property. Section 512(h) requires
nothing more. Several online-privacy advocacy
groups stated that the "RIAA's likely argument
that 'if it quacks like a duck and walks like a duck,
it is a duck' should not be sufficient to override
constitutional free speech rights, especially when
the RIAA is perfectly capable of examining the
creature.' ' I " As a consequence, innocent users
will lose their online anonymity and their right to
anonymous online speech.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the require-
ments to obtain a subpoena under Section 512 (h)
are inadequate because they allow copyright hold-
ers to conduct illegal searches and seizures clearly
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Informa-
tion complied by businesses about their clientele
is property of that business. Section 512(h) allows
a copyright holder with virtually no proof of ille-
gal activity, to steal information and use it for
their own purposes. The RIAA never adequately
addresses the fact that its method of obtaining a
"good faith belief' is inaccurate and lacks particu-
larity, as required by the Fourth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stanford technology law professor Lawrence
Lessig believes that "American copyright laws have
gotten so out of hand that they are causing the
death of culture and the loss of the world's intel-
lectual history . . . New laws such as the 1998
[DMCA] are 'not speaking for those who create,
but those who hold massive amounts of copy-
right. ' 1 8 7 While Lessig's beliefs may be a bit ex-
treme, he does succeed in drawing attention to
the unbalanced and unfair nature of the DMCA.
While the right of copyright owners' to protect
their materials from infringement and illegal dis-
tribution remains crucial, especially over the In-
ternet, copyright owners must not be allowed to
186, Id. at 16 n.12.
187 Karlin Lillington, VWiy Copyright Laws Hurt Culture,
WIRED.COM, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,
48625,00.html (Nov. 27, 2001).
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subpoena personal information from ISPs about
its subscribers under Section 512(h) of the
DMCA, as the RIAA interprets it.
Section 512(h) of the DMCA represents a sub-
stantial departure from traditional subpoena au-
thority and is unconstitutional on three grounds.
First, it violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because it provides the subpoe-
naed party no opportunity to object, as required
by Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure; it allows a pre-judgment seizure of the ISP's
confidential business property, placing at risk the
business relationship between the ISP and its sub-
scribers; and it places an undue burden upon the
subpoenaed party. Second, Section 512(h) vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
because it allows a private party, without any sub-
stantial and particular evidentiary support, to con-
duct a search and seizure of the subpoenaed
party's information, thus violating Internet users'
right to privacy. Third, Section 512(h) conse-
quently violates Internet users' right to free
speech by forcing users to lose their online ano-
nymity, which has been declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.
For these reasons, copyright holders must not
be allowed to subpoena ISPs under Section
512(h) of the DMCA as it is written. A copyright
owner could achieve the same purpose by filing a
John Doe suit against the unknown infringer and
then serving a third-party subpoena on the ISP to
obtain the infringer's personal information. This
method allows the subpoenaed ISP an opportu-
nity to object or file a motion to quash on the
ground that the subpoena requires disclosure of
confidential business information, and protects it
from "bad faith" allegations without evidentiary
support.
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